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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate earnings restatements are regarded as one of the most significant issues in accounting 
today.  While there are various factors that can influence profitability, revenue is the key 
contributor to a business’ net income.  During the 2000s, a multitude of domestic and 
multinational corporations faced significant issues with their revenue recognition practices.  
Although the investing public might regard any revenue restatement as laden with possible fraud, 
this is not always the case.  Multinational firms face dual accounting systems, such as U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). Currently, similarities and differences between the accounting systems exist.  
However, key differences between GAAP and IFRS may cease to exist in upcoming years due to 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB’s) and the International Accounting 
Standards Board’s (IASB’s) joint effort to converge the two systems.  Throughout this paper, 
examples of revenue “miscalculations” will be presented as well any penalties levied by the U.S. 
Securities & Exchange Commission against implicated corporations.  Accordingly, the impact that 
revenue blunders have on shareholder wealth will be examined.  Finally, the authors will present 
recommendations for mitigating revenue “errors” in the future. 
 
Keywords:  Revenue Recognition; Bill-and-Hold Sales; Percentage-of-Completion Method; Earnings Restatements; 
Earnings Reserves; IFRS; U.S. GAAP; Convergence Project; Fraud; Shareholder Wealth 
 
 
U.S. GAAP REVENUE RECOGNITION OVERVIEW 
 
he bottom line of any business’ income statement is considered one of the most critical indicators of 
corporate wealth.  While net income is paramount for current and prospective shareholders and 
creditors to make rational investment decisions, profits would be nonexistent without the presence of 
revenue.  Revenue, which enhances the equity of any business, can be derived from a multitude of sources.  
According to Don Kieso, Jerry Weygandt, and Terry Warfield, authors of Intermediate Accounting (14
th
 edition), 
revenue can be defined as: 
 
inflows or enhancements of assets of an entity or settlements of its liabilities during a period from delivering or 
producing goods, rendering services, or carrying out other activities that constitute an entity’s ongoing major or 
central operations. (p. 55) 
 
Thus, in order for a transaction to translate into revenue, the exchange must be relevant to the entity’s core 
business.  Sales revenue is the most basic form of revenue as this represents the selling prices for goods and/or 
services.  Depending on the income source, the term can also be referred to as “sales, fees, rent, interest, royalties, 
warranty revenue, and service revenue” (Kieso, Weygandt, & Warfield, p. 1067).  Although one may believe that 
the process of recording revenue is straightforward, this is not nearly the case.  U.S. GAAP contains multiple 
approaches to revenue recognition.  However, the correct method will depend on the nature of a transaction. 
 
Revenue recognition standards, under U.S. GAAP, are primarily developed by the FASB, and are enforced 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  FASB, a private standard setting body, located in Norwalk, 
T 
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CT, currently creates the vast majority of accounting rules that become GAAP.  In addition, FASB established a 
conceptual framework which defines the critical elements of a corporation’s financial statements.  General revenue 
recognition criteria are presented within FASB’s Statement of Financial Accounting Concept (SFAC) No. 5.  
According to SFAC No. 5, “revenue is to be recognized when it is realized or realizable and when it is earned” 
(FASB, 1984, p. 7).  For revenue to be realized, the seller must receive cash or other consideration (assets) from the 
buyer for purposes of the sale.  On the other hand, realizable revenue indicates that the buyer has offered a valid 
promise to pay.  At this time, the seller will accrue either an account receivable or a note receivable based on the 
characteristics of the transaction (Briner, 2001).  Finally, for revenue to be earned, the seller must have fulfilled or 
nearly-fulfilled their obligations to the buyer (Kieso, Weygandt, & Warfield, p. 1067).  This typically occurs when 
“the buyer gains possession of an item or all other contractual obligations have been met” (Briner, 2001).  Thus, 
both criteria must be present for the seller to book the revenue from the transaction. 
 
Within financial accounting, the most common approach is to record revenue at the “point of sale.”  Under 
this system, the seller has determined the selling price for the goods or services, delivery to the buyer has occurred, 
and the buyer has either paid the seller or is obligated to pay the seller (Kieso, Weygandt, & Warfield, p. 1069).  
Thus, there is high certainty that both parties will fulfill their obligations.  However, depending on the complexity of 
the transaction, it can sometimes be challenging to determine when the revenue is “earned.”  For example, point of 
sale transactions can be clouded by variants to the rule such as, bill-and-hold sales.  A bill-and-hold sale involves a 
special case where the seller has transferred the legal title for the goods and the economic rights to the buyer, but 
due to the buyer’s request, the seller houses the product until the buyer is ready to accept delivery.  A challenge can 
exist when the seller attempts to decipher when the economic benefits for the goods have transferred to the 
purchaser.  With specific regard to bill-and-hold transactions, the FASB states, 
 
A customer may obtain control of a product even though that product remains in the physical possession of the 
entity [seller].  In such cases, the customer has the ability to direct the use of and obtain substantially all of the 
remaining benefits of the product even though it has decided not to exercise its right to take possession of the 
product. (FASB, 2011, p. 53) 
 
In addition, the FASB discusses four criteria for when control has been transferred to the buyer.  FASB 
indicates that control passes if “(a) the reason for the bill-and-hold is substantive; (b) the product is separately 
identified as belonging to the customer; (c) the product is ready for physical transfer; and (d) the entity [seller] 
cannot use the product or sell it to another customer” (FASB, 2011, p. 53).  Contractual agreements, such as these, 
can cause multiple complexities in the revenue recognition process. 
 
In contrast to “point-of-sale” transactions, GAAP also allows for revenue to be recognized prior to delivery 
via the percentage-of-completion method.  This method is typically applicable to long-term construction projects, 
but can be applied in other instances. Under this approach, the “seller” will record revenue, gross profit, and costs in 
multiple accounting periods.  The value of the revenue, earnings, and costs will be based on the percentage of the 
project completed during that particular stage.  In order to compute the percentage complete, the “seller” would need 
to divide cumulative costs, since the inception of the project, by the estimate of total construction costs (Kieso, 
Weygandt, & Warfield, p. 1083).  As U.S. GAAP is grounded on the matching principle (which mandates that 
revenue must be matched with expenses incurred during the same accounting period), it is important for revenue to 
be recorded periodically throughout the tenure of the long-duration project.  Thus, the percentage-of-completion 
method is used to allocate earnings to the accounting periods when earned.  If this rule did not exist and a five-year 
construction project took place, the seller would not be able to report any revenue until the fifth year.  This would 
create the illusion that the company had little revenue during the first four years, but had substantial revenue and 
earnings in the last year of the project.  In this instance, stakeholders would not be provided with timely information, 
and thus, the usefulness of the financial statements would be severely diminished. 
 
Though there is an array of approaches available for U.S. public corporations to recognize revenue, 
businesses must understand that a particular rule can only be applied when the proper conditions exist.  An overview 
of various revenue recognition policies is displayed in Table 1.  Nonetheless, in recent years, there have been 
numerous cases of entities misapplying U.S. revenue recognition rules.  In the subsequent section, the authors will 
present examples of corporations accused of defying the law. 
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Table 1: U.S. GAAP Revenue Recognition Methods 
Point-Of-Sale
Bill & Hold Transfer of title & economic benefits has occured.  However, the buyer requests that the product remain with seller, 
Sales with Buybacks
Consignment Sales
Percentage of Completion Revenue is recorded in each accounting period as the "seller" gradually completes the "product." 
Revenue recorded is based on the percentage of the total project complete.  
The proper criteria must exist for this methodto be utilized.
Source:  Kieso, Weygandt, Warfield.  Intermediate Accounting. 14th edition.  Chapter 18
Revenue is recognized when 1) realized or realizable & 2) when earned. This typically occurs at time of delivery.
until the buyer is ready to accept delivery.  The proper criteria must exist for this method to be utilized. 
A "Seller" transfers merchandise to a buyer with the intent of repurchasing the merchandise at a later date.  As the 
risk of ownership is retained with the seller, a true sale hasn't occurred.  This is a financing transaction. 
The cosignor sells inventory via another entity referred to as the cosignee.  Although the consignee collects 
the proceeds from a sale, the sale occurs on the cosignor's books. 
 
 
Examples of Corporate Revenue Misstatements 
 
Nearly all industries have faced scandals for the inaccurate reporting of financial results.  Industries 
affected include, but are not limited to the consulting, technology, financial service, media, medical, energy, food & 
beverage, retail, and manufacturing sectors.  According to Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of 
Enforcement, “Overly aggressive accounting can distort a company’s true financial condition and mislead investors” 
(SEC, 2009, August 4).  As a result of total SEC enforcement actions, the agency collected over “$5.9 billion in 
disgorgement and penalties during fiscal years 2011 and 2012...for the benefit of harmed shareholders” (SEC, 2012, 
November 14).  Total enforcement actions included penalties for “financial crisis-related cases, insider trading cases, 
issuer and disclosure violations, infringements of the Foreign Corrupts Practices Act of 1977, and actions against 
investment advisers and broker dealers” (SEC, 2012, November).  Revenue recognition violation cases are included 
within the “issuer and disclosure violations” section. 
 
Nonetheless, while the abovementioned industries have been impacted by various scandals, the focus of 
this paper is on revenue recognition-related issues.  Figure 1 reflects SEC Enforcement Actions for industries 
affected by Reporting & Disclosure Violations.  Next, an example of a revenue recognition violation within the 
technology industry will be presented. 
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Figure 1: SEC Enforcement Actions - Industries Affected by Reporting & Disclosure Violations (2011 & 2012) 
 
Technology: Hewlett Packard (HP) 
 
The first case of revenue deception involves the technology behemoth, Hewlett Packard (HP).  HP, the 
manufacturer of computer hardware, was subject to an accounting scandal resulting from the purchase of a U.K.-
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based software manufacturer - Autonomy.  The acquisition was completed in October 2011 at a purchase price of 
$11.1 billion, or £25.50 per share.  This value represented a 76% premium over the trading price at the time of the 
announcement (Haddon, 2011).  Although HP’s intentions to boost profitability and enhance stockholder wealth 
were sensible, the diversification into the software market, via the acquisition, created major troubles for the entity.  
Within one year after the acquisition, HP alleged that there were significant accounting anomalies at the subsidiary 
(HP, 2012 Annual Report, p. 32).  Via an internal investigation, HP claimed that some of the Autonomy’s 
employees intentionally misled investors by “inflating the [company’s] underlying financial metrics” (Worthen, 
2012, November 27). 
 
HP’s allegations against Autonomy were multifold.  The company was accused of falsely booking 
hardware sales as software sales in order to artificially improve profits.  Typically, software sales yield higher profit 
margins versus hardware sales.  In addition, the subsidiary purportedly sold hardware to “value added resellers,” 
who acted as intermediaries between the customers and Autonomy.  However, these “sales” typically did not 
translate into a true customer purchase.  Nonetheless, the company booked these sales as licenses. Finally, HP 
claims that the subsidiary booked revenue from long-term software subscriptions immediately instead of deferring 
revenue recognition, as required by GAAP (Hesseldahl, 2012, November 20). 
 
As a result of HP’s findings of significant “accounting improprieties, misrepresentations, and disclosure 
failures,” the technology giant was forced to record a $5 billion write-down - or approximately 45% of the 
acquisition price - during the fourth quarter of 2012.  In total, HP took a charge of $8.8 billion from the deal 
(Worthen, 2012, November 27).  The full loss was comprised of a write-down of both goodwill and an intangible 
asset impairment charge (HP, 2012 Annual Report, p. 32).  Goodwill, which is an asset, is created only when an 
acquiring company pays more than the fair market value of net identifiable assets of the acquire.  This asset can be 
impaired if the perceived value of the acquiree deteriorates. 
 
The above losses were also partially based on a retroactive revision to the subsidiary’s revenues and 
earnings using the “correct” measurements.  However, Autonomy’s founder, Mr. Michael Lynch, claims that any 
accounting discrepancies are due to key differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS and that HP was aware of these 
differences (Worthen, 2012, December).  Table 2 is an overview of how U.S. GAAP and IFRS diverge with regard 
to software revenue recognition. 
 
Table 2: Software Revenue Recognition - GAAP vs. IFRS 
U.S. GAAP IFRS
Sales Transactions:
1) Revenue Can't Be Recognized if Master Agreement isn't Signed  (pg. 6) 1) A Sale Occures When A Purchase Order is Received & Economic Benefit 
2) Pervasive Evidence of an Arrangement Must Exist Via a Signature (pg. 7) Has Been Transferred to the Buyer (pg. 6)
Licenses:
1) Under Agreements Where Licenses Are Sold with Products, The "Seller" Must 1) Lack of Stringent Rules to Determine Fair Value:  
Provide "Vendor Specifc Objective Evidence" (VSOE) of the Fair Value For The License. (p. 8) Estimated Value Can Be Used Based On Market Information
2) Without Delivery and/or VSOE, Revenue Cannot Be Recorded (pg. 9) 2) Revenue will Only Be Deferred If An Estimate of Fair Value Can't Be Determined (pg 10)
3) VSOE Very Specific In Determing Fair Value (pg 10) 3) No Specific Information Regarding Post-Contract Support Is Included Under IFRS (p. 13)
4) If Products or Licenses Include Post-Contract Support, The Fair Value
of The Post-Contract Support Is Deferred and Earned Over the Service Period (pg. 12) Source: http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/technology/pdf/shiftingsoftware.pdf
 
 
As presented in the above table, GAAP requires additional evidence from a software sale or license to be 
booked when compared to IFRS.  According to the accounting firm, Grant Thorton, “Revenue Recognition for 
software vendors can be complicated” (Davies, 2012).  This complexity occurs because software is generally 
packaged with other products, such as a personal computer.  Autonomy asserts that HP has no fundamental claim 
against the subsidiary’s practices with value-added resellers either because, under IFRS, “revenue can be recognized 
if sales are delivered in the current period, there is no right of return, collection is probable, and the fee is fixed or 
determinable” (Davies, 2012).  In addition, the revenue recognition process for licenses may appear to be legal 
under IFRS as fair value estimates are permitted. 
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Regardless of Autonomy’s defense, HP notified the SEC, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and The U.K. 
Serious Fraud Office about their findings.  Thus, as of November 21, 2012, the DOJ opened an official investigation 
into the accounting practices of the subsidiary (HP, 2012 Annual Report, pp. 157-159).  A formal exploration into 
Autonomy’s accounting procedures was started by the U.K. Serious Fraud Office as well (BBC, 2013, March).  As 
of this writing, a verdict has not been reached against Autonomy. 
 
Consequently, due to the fraud allegations, nine lawsuits have been launched by shareholder groups against 
HP (HP, 2012 Annual Report, pp. 157-159).  In May 2013, a billion dollar class action lawsuit was also filed by 
shareholders.  The charge suggests that HP was aware of the accounting issues at Autonomy but did not disclose this 
fact to the public. Accordingly, when the issues at Autonomy were fully disclosed in November 2012, HP’s stock 
lost over $3.4 billion in market capitalization in a single day (Gardside, 2013). Thus, the lawsuit intends to recover 
some of this lost capital. 
 
Nonetheless, HP’s CEO, Meg Whittman, indicated that Autonomy will remain a key component of the 
company’s future success and that HP has no plans to divest the unit (Leach, 2013).  Although the colossal losses 
adversely impacted shareholder wealth after the negative information became public, the parent company appears 
convinced that the acquisition will provide long-term revenue and profitability improvement. 
 
Technology - Nortel, Inc. 
 
In continuation with the technology sector, Nortel, the former multinational telecommunications and data 
networking equipment manufacturer, was also accused of artificially boosting its financial performance.  Although 
Nortel is a Canadian corporation, the company began using GAAP in January 2000 as its common stock traded in 
the U.S.  Foreign public companies can choose to list their stock on U.S. stock exchanges as an American 
Depository Receipt (ADR). 
 
Nortel was accused of neglecting to adjust “internal accounting guidelines” to coincide with GAAP (SEC, 
Court Complaint, 2007, p. 11). Specifically, the SEC alleged that between late 2000 and early 2001, Nortel 
executives intentionally recorded future revenues as earned in the current accounting period.  According to the SEC 
complaint, Nortel was motivated to engage in revenue manipulation as actual results fell $2 billion short of forecasts 
in 2000 and 2001.  The SEC claimed that the CFO, the Controller, and the Assistant Controller “altered Nortel’s 
revenue recognition policies to accelerate revenues as needed to meet Nortel’s quarterly and annual revenue 
guidance” (SEC, Nortel Court Complaint, 2007, pp. 2-3).  Nortel recorded faux revenue by misusing the option to 
record a sale as a “bill-and-hold transaction.”  The entity recorded revenue on “undelivered inventory sitting 
warehouses and offsite storage locations” (SEC, Nortel Court Complaint, 2007, pp. 2-3).  However, the structure of 
these “transactions” did not meet the criteria for bill-and-hold to be utilized.  Correspondingly, revenue for 2000 was 
overstated by $1 billion (SEC, Nortel Court Complaint, 2007, pp. 2-3). 
 
According to the SEC, although Nortel initially adopted bill-and-hold accounting, the company banished its 
use as the recognition process was rendered complex.  Yet, as Nortel’s sales began to negatively diverge from 
analyst expectations, management chose to resurrect the accounting method.  However, the company allegedly 
violated GAAP by adopting its own criteria to record sales.  Nortel purportedly approached clients and encouraged 
them to engage in bill-and-hold transactions.  This tactic is illegal under U.S. GAAP (SEC, Nortel Court Complaint, 
2007, pp. 17-18). 
 
In addition, the SEC asserted that Nortel created earnings reserves and did not follow GAAP’s reserve 
disbursement requirements. Instead, the executives allegedly used the reserves to manipulate earnings to boost 
profitability in quarters where losses truly resulted, as was the case in the first quarter of 2003.  Thus, management 
touted that the company had returned to profitability ahead of schedule and thus used this event to distribute bonuses 
(SEC, 2007, October). 
 
As a result of the revenue “errors,” Nortel was forced to restate revenues from the 2000-2003 period and 
take punitive action against the involved executives.  In 2004, the entity terminated CEO Frank Dunn, the 
Controller, Michael Gollogly, and the CFO, Douglas Beatty, due to their involvement in these schemes. In addition, 
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in 2005, the company was forced to downgrade previously reported revenue by $3.4 billion (SEC, Nortel Court 
Complaint, 2007, p. 3).  Also in 2006, the company admitted that the revenue restatements were partly due to 
“management fraud” (SEC, Norte Court Complaint, 2007, p. 6). 
 
In October 2007, the SEC concluded that Nortel must pay a $35 million civil fine for violating U.S. 
revenue recognition standards.  The SEC indicated that this monetary penalty was allocated to shareholders who 
endured losses resulting from the corrupt activity.  The company was also forced to update the SEC on the current 
condition of internal controls over revenue recognition policies moving forward (SEC, 2007, October).  However, in 
January 2013, the three primary executives (Dunn, Gollogly, and Beatty) were acquitted on all fraud charges by the 
Canadian court system as “the prosecution failed to meet the burden of proof test,” according to the judge (Judge 
Marrocco) who ruled on the case (Dummett, 2013).  Hence, the three executives did not face any penalties from the 
scandal. 
 
Regardless of Nortel’s attempted accounting maneuvers, the tactics did not result in long-term profitability.  
Partly as a result of the harsh financial conditions during the financial crisis, the company filed for bankruptcy in 
2009.  As of early 2013, Nortel has divested all assets and the stock is rendered worthless (Nortel Networks, 2013). 
 
Media -TheStreet, Inc. 
 
Although the technology sector contained some of the largest revenue recognition cases, the media sector 
has also been impacted.  In December 2012, TheStreet, Inc., a New York based internet financial news company, 
was charged by the SEC for committing accounting fraud (Gandel, 2012).  In contrast to the Nortel example, 
TheStreet actually detected its own accounting irregularities and reported these findings.  The SEC complaint argued 
that TheStreet had “filed false financial reports by reporting revenue from fraudulent transactions at a subsidiary it 
had acquired the previous year” (SEC, 2012, December 18).  The charge was also extended to the company’s former 
CFO, Eric Ashman, as well as the co-presidents of the acquired subsidiary, Gregg Alwine and David Barnett (Ryan, 
2012).  Specifically, TheStreet’s former CFO, Eric Ashman, was accused of allowing for “revenue to be reported 
before it was earned,” which clearly violates GAAP (SEC, 2012, December 18). 
 
Though actions taken by Ashman contributed to the revenue misrepresentation, the SEC asserted that the 
chief reason for these “errors” was due to a lack of internal controls at the acquired subsidiary, Promotions.com 
(Ryan, 2012).  For instance, the SEC claimed that “Alwine and Barnett had tampered with documents, backdated 
revenue contracts, and acquired an erroneous audit confirmation that pretended that the subsidiary earned revenue 
via completing work” (Ryan, 2012).  In conjunction with Ashman’s approval, Promotions.com recorded $305,000 in 
erroneous profits by recognizing revenue prior to completing the actual work (Ryan, 2012).  In this case, the 
business improperly applied the percentage-of-completion method.  According to the SEC, instead of TheStreet 
calculating a valid estimate for the percentage complete, the company booked revenue based on “the say so of 
management” (SEC, 2012, TheStreet Court Complaint, p. 6). In another instance, the co-presidents of the subsidiary 
engaged in “sham transactions” which created a revenue mirage of an additional $275,000 (Ryan, 2012). 
 
As a result of these “accounting errors,” TheStreet overstated its 2008 income by 152% or $1.7 million 
(SEC, 2012, TheStreet Court Complaint, p. 6).  Due to these accounting irregularities, the company restated its 2008 
earnings in January 2010 (SEC, 2012, TheStreet Court Complaint, p. 6). With regard to the executives, Ashman, 
Barnett, and Alwine were forced to pay penalties of $159,240, $130,000, and $120,000, respectively.  While 
TheStreet’s CFO is banned from acting as an executive or board member for any U.S. public company for three 
years, the subsidiary’s presidents each received harsher 10-year banishments (SEC, 2012, December 18). 
 
With respect to the company as a whole, “[it] is not required to pay any monetary penalties” (Gandel, 
2012).  Most likely, this can be attributed to the fact that TheStreet found its own accounting discrepancies and 
dutifully reported those violations to the SEC.  TheStreet divested Promotions.com in 2009 (Gandel, 2012). 
 
Manufacturing - Diebold, Inc. 
 
With regard to the manufacturing sector, Ohio-based Diebold Inc., the producer of electronic voting 
machines, ATMs, and bank security systems, was accused of “manipulating earnings by at least $127 million” via 
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revenue recognition “errors” (SEC, 2010, Diebold Court Complaint, p. 1).  The complaint indicated that Diebold 
artificially enhanced income by “improperly using ‘bill-and-hold’ accounting, recognizing revenue on lease 
agreements subject to buyback opportunities, manipulating reserves and accruals, improperly delaying and 
capitalizing expenses, and writing up the value of used inventory” (SEC, 2010, Diebold Court Complaint, p. 1).  All 
of the aforementioned “miscalculations” are in clear violation of GAAP.  According to the SEC, the company issued 
at least forty erroneous reports containing accounting mishaps between 2002 and 2007 (SEC, 2010, Diebold Court 
Complaint, p. 1). 
 
The SEC report provides insight into the purpose behind the revenue manipulations.  For example, Diebold 
was accused of attempting to devise ways to “close the gap” between actual earnings performance and profit 
expectations.  The company used an assortment of strategies to artificially bolster revenue and income.  For 
instance, Diebold violated GAAP by recognizing a sale when inventory was shipped from the factory to the 
company’s warehouse.  In some instances, the corporation would recognize sales prematurely by shipping 
merchandise to their warehouses ahead of schedule.  These “sales” were recorded under the “bill-and-hold basis” but 
allegedly the customers never requested for the seller to retain the merchandise (SEC, 2010, Diebold Court 
Complaint, p. 4).  As can be observed by the other cases, misuse of “bill-and-hold accounting” appears to be a 
common theme (see Table 3 for a summary of the allegations and applicable penalties against each corporation).  
According to the SEC, recording revenue in this manner falsely boosted revenue by nearly $30 million in 2003 
(SEC, 2010, Diebold Court Complaint, p. 10).  After these “errors” were detected, the entity revised its bill-and-hold 
process to coincide with GAAP and was forced to reduce affected earnings by a cumulative total of approximately 
$56 million (SEC, 2010, Diebold Court Complaint, p. 10). 
 
Table 3: Summary of Revenue Recognition Cases 
Corporation Years Assertion Execuitve Corp. Executive Penalty Corporate
Guilty? Guilty? Penalty
Hewlett-Packard Early 2010s Subsidiary Booked Sales From NYD NYD NYD NYD; E$
VARs & Licenses Inaccurately
Nortel 2000-03 Misuse of Bill-and-Hold Accounting No Yes CEO, CFO, & Controller Acquitted $35m; E$
TheStreet, Inc. Mid/Late 2000s Subsidiary Created False Transactions Yes No CFO: $160k; Subsidiary Co-Presidents: $250k N/A; E$
& Misapplied % of completion
Diebold 2002-07 Inaccurate Use of Bill-&-Hold Yes Yes CEO disgorges $470k in stock and stock options $25m; E$
Four Other Executives: NYD
General Electric 2002-03 Recorded Sales of Locomotives & No Yes N/A $50m; E$
Spare Parts When Criteria Not Present
Abbreviat ions
NYD= Not Yet Determined VARs= Value Added Resellers
E$= Earnings Restatement
 
 
Another strategy Diebold used to inflate earnings was through the use of a bogus earnings reserve, similar 
to Nortel.  In connection with the bill-and-hold transactions, in 2003 Diebold developed a profit reserve.  While it is 
not illegal under GAAP to create a reserve, the profits must be released when the revenue is actually earned by the 
company.  Hence, an earnings reserve actually is created when revenue is temporarily deferred.  However, according 
to the SEC, Diebold released profits when earnings were truly deteriorating.  Thus, the company falsely boosted 
earnings in 2004 by $7.5 million (SEC, 2010, Diebold Court Complaint, p. 11). 
 
In June 2010, the SEC forced Diebold to pay $25 million in civil penalties related to the revenue 
“miscalculations.”  In addition, four executives connected with the issue were charged (SEC, 2010, June 10).  Also, 
the CEO, Walden O’Dell, though not entangled in the fraud, agreed to disgorge cash bonuses of $470,000 as well as 
shares of Diebold stock and stock options.  These disbursements were deemed necessary since they were awarded 
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during the period when the “enhanced” financial statements were issued (SEC, 2010, June 10).  The case against the 
other four executives has not been settled as of this writing. 
 
Multi-Sector - General Electric 
 
The next case involves one of the most highly regarded blue-chip companies in the world.  General Electric 
(GE), headquartered in Fairfield, Connecticut, was accused of manipulating its earnings through various revenue 
recognition techniques.  The SEC was compelled to launch an investigation into the conglomerate’s accounting 
practices as GE consistently met or exceeded Wall Street analysts’ earnings expectations in each quarter between 
1995 and 2004 (Leone & Reason, 2009).  Although it is possible that a business will consistently meet or surpass 
earnings forecasts, it is improbable that this could occur consecutively in each quarter for 10 years in a row. 
 
However, the SEC’s focus was on activity transpiring between 2002 and 2003.  “On four separate 
occasions in 2002 and 2003, high-level accounting executives or other personnel approved accounting which was 
not in compliance with GAAP,” claimed the SEC (SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, p. 1-2).  The SEC asserted that 
the entity misapplied revenue recognition standards for the sales of locomotives and sales of spare parts for aircraft 
engines (SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, p. 3). 
 
During the fourth quarters of 2002 and 2003, the corporation recorded revenue from sales of trains (Leone 
& Reason, 2009), yet these locomotives were not sold to the typical railroad-oriented client.  Instead, the machinery 
was transferred to a financial intermediary with the intent that the financial institution would subsequently resell the 
merchandise to the appropriate customers in the ensuing quarter.  These financial institutions profited from the 
transactions by charging GE fees and interest (SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, p. 18-20). 
 
Although the trains were “sold” to the financial institution, GAAP does not allow for revenue recognition 
because the product not only remained with the seller, but the seller maintained continual support for the products.  
GE still stored the trains on their property and provided the necessary fuel and maintenance for the equipment.  
These “sales” were not limited to a few locomotives.  In the fourth quarter of 2002, 191 trains were “sold.”  
However, 68.6% of these of these transactions resulted from illegitimate sales that should have been recorded in the 
subsequent quarter (Henry, 2009).  Accordingly, revenue, for this business segment, was artificially enhanced during 
the fourth quarter of 2002 and the fourth quarter of 2003 by $223 million (8.8%) and $158 million (22.6%), 
respectively.  Consequently, in July 2007, GE announced that the revenue recognition was “inappropriately 
accelerated” and, subsequently, restated financial results for the aforementioned quarters (Leone & Reason, 2009; 
SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, p. 23). 
 
Further revenue misstatements occurred in the company’s aircraft spare parts business between 2002 and 
2007 (SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, p. 30).  In an effort the boost earnings, GE adjusted a key accounting 
process.  First, the company eliminated a method of accounting for spare parts transactions, labeled as the Revenue 
Accounting Model (RAM) for new aircraft engine sales.  Under this approach, the company determined profit 
margins by combining “low margins from aircraft engine sales with high margins from spare parts/spare engines for 
those aircraft” (SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, p. 24).  These profit margins were computed by incorporating 
actual margins with projected margins (SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, p. 24).  In this respect, a projected profit 
margin is a highly questionable and unreliable technique under GAAP.  Accordingly, in 2002 the company 
abolished RAM and, thus, earnings declined by $844 million (SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, p. 27). 
 
Yet, in an effort to counteract the loss resulting from the elimination of RAM, GE orchestrated a method 
where the spare parts were transferred to another GE business unit where the percentage of completion was used.  
This tactic created $1 billion in additional earnings (SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, p. 27).  This “gain” from the 
interdepartmental transfers more than absorbed the “loss” from the elimination of RAM.  Additionally, GE saved the 
difference, valued at $156 million, and established a “cookie jar” reserve.  A cookie jar reserve indicates a 
hypothetical fund where profits are held and released at a future date.  GE also violated GAAP by releasing the 
incremental profits in future periods when earnings were fundamentally weaker.  These practices lead to GE 
overstating their net earnings by $585 million in 2002.  Consequently, in 2008 the corporation restated its revenues 
and earnings for the 2003-2007 period (SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, pp. 29-30). 
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After a lengthy four-year investigation, GE settled the accounting fraud charges.  In August 2009, the entity 
settled with the SEC to pay a $50 million civil penalty as a result of the above-mentioned issues, as well as 
“improper accounting for hedging transactions and interest rate derivative securities” (Henry, 2009).  According to 
the Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, Robert Khuzami, “GE bent the accounting rules beyond the 
breaking point” (SEC, 2009, August 4).  In addition, throughout the tenure of this investigation, the company 
incurred $200 million in legal and accounting costs.  Nonetheless, these costs and penalties are relatively 
insignificant in comparison to the conglomerate’s total revenue and earnings. 
 
Impact on Stakeholder Wealth 
 
Although the degree of losses and/or write-downs has been quantified, the impact on shareholder wealth 
must also be assessed.  Typically, if an organization’s revenue and profits continue to climb, the stock price will 
follow suit.  However, those reported numbers must be trustworthy.  As a corporation’s integrity becomes impaired 
due to revenue and earnings restatements, there has been a significant impact on the common stock price as shown 
in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Impact of Revenue Misstatements on Shareholder Wealth 
Company Change in Stock on Day Accounting Date Accounting Irregularity Annual Performance During Year That
Name Irregularity or Restatement is Announced or Restatement Was Announced Accounting Irregularity or Restatement is Announced
Hewlett-Packard -11.95% (November 21, 2012) 17.20%
Nortel -28.36% (April 28, 2004) -17.92%
TheStreet 28.17% (Jan 25, 2010) 11.25%
Diebold -2.98% (January 16, 2008) -3.07%
General Electric -0.26% (February 19, 2008) -56.30%
Average -3.08% -9.77%
Standard Deviation 20.6% 29.3%  
 
While the information presented in Table 4 illustrates a short-term and intermediate-term view, it is also 
important to assess the long-term impact on shareholders.  Although the market value of the previously-mentioned 
companies (except Nortel) has stabilized, none of the discussed companies’ stocks are near their historical highs.  In 
comparison to the all-time high (which is the highest market value ever recorded for a company’s stock), HP, 
TheStreet, Diebold, and GE’s stocks, as of May 2013, have declined by 67%, 95%, 46%, and 60% (Yahoo Finance). 
Nortel’s stock, on the other hand, is now worthless as the business is defunct.  Typically, when a security declines 
significantly from its maximum value, shareholders will demand organizational changes. 
 
It appears that as the listed companies’ stock prices deteriorated, there might have been greater incentive 
for management to boost profits.  Although the chief goal of a corporation is to amplify shareholder wealth, the 
maximization should occur legitimately through organic earnings growth and not accounting tactics that violate 
GAAP. 
 
In addition, shareholders can also be harmed due to the deteriorating financial position of a corporation.  
Lawsuits can create major contingent liabilities.  For example, if the $1 billion lawsuit against HP materializes, the 
losses can multiply and negatively impact income and stockholder’s wealth. 
 
Conversely, revenue recognition scandals can also have negative ramifications on bondholders (creditors).  
For example, although it is possible that Autonomy’s accounting issues are due to the differences between GAAP 
and IFRS, the credit markets decided to punish HP’s bond prices first and ask questions later.  On the wake of HP’s 
announcement of the massive impairment loss, the company’s bonds began to trade as if they were “junk”  A junk 
bond typically carries a high interest rate due to increased risk.  After the announcement, interest rates on the entity’s 
corporate debt increased by nearly 0.25%.  This resulted in HP’s five- and ten-year bonds trading at nearly 2.94% 
and 3.35% beyond U.S. treasury bonds (Robinson, 2012). Accordingly, one week later Moody’s Investors Service 
downgraded the company’s credit rating.  Moody’s is a credit ratings agency that rates the quality of an entity’s 
long-term debts.  Moody’s downgraded HP’s bonds to Baa1 from A3 as the company was rendered to carry greater 
risk (Hesseldahl, 2012, November 28).  This reduction in credit quality placed HP’s corporate bonds on the lower 
end of the investment grade scale (Moody’s, p. 6). 
 
Although Moody’s didn’t mention the case against Autonomy, it is likely that the massive impairment loss 
influenced the downgrade.  As observed, when credit downgrades occur, interest rates can rise dramatically on 
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outstanding debt issues.  Higher interest rates will not only reduce the market price of a company’s bonds 
(bondholder will suffer losses) but can increase interest expense for future debt issues.  Increased expenses can 
result in reduced profitability and also harm shareholders. 
 
In addition, as Nortel Inc. filed bankruptcy, bondholders are attempting to recover their investment.  
Although the equity has been completely eliminated, some bond issues are still trading in the market.  As of May 
2013, one of the company’s bond issues, due in 2023, was trading at roughly half price (Church, 2013).  It is a 
reasonable assumption that the creditors will collect only the current fair value of the bond.  Hence, creditors are 
significantly harmed in the Nortel case as well. Although the revenue recognition scandal didn’t cause the 
bankruptcy, it was certainly a symptom of an underlying condition. 
 
Trend in Reporting & Disclosure Enforcement Actions 
 
While there are still a significant number of companies mishandling revenue recognition laws, there has 
been a noticeable decline in SEC enforcement actions with regard to reporting and disclosure (R&S) investigations.  
For example, in 2007, actions against companies with R&S breaches comprised 33% of total enforcement actions.  
However, by 2012, only 12.8% of total violations resulted from reporting and disclosure issues, including violations 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (SEC, 2007; SEC, 2012).  See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: SEC Enforcement Actions – Issuer Reporting & Disclosure 
 
Why has the following trend occurred?  According to Stephen Juris, a Forbes contributor, “corporate 
executives are less inclined to risk their financial security or liberty to cook their employers’ books” (Juris, 2012).  It 
is also quite possible that the stringent requirements set forth by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SoX) have 
assisted in reducing overall financial reporting abuses.  SoX, a law that was created as a result of massive financial 
accounting scandals occurring in the early 2000s (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco), significantly increases an 
executive’s responsibility over the financial reporting process.  In addition, management must conduct a thorough 
assessment of their corporation’s internal controls over financial reporting (Cascini & DelFavero, 2008, p. 24). Each 
quarter, executives need to sign off on the validity of the financial statements and are required to issue a report 
attesting to the effectiveness of internal controls (Juris, 2012).  If SoX is violated, executives may face severe 
penalties and jail-time. 
 
According to Juris, it is plausible that the provisions of SoX have not only deterred management from 
engaging in fraudulent schemes, but the thorough assessment of internal controls has also allowed for deficiencies to 
be remedied prior to the development of significant GAAP compliance issues (Juris, 2012). 
 
It is clear that there is a consistent downtrend in SEC enforcement actions resulting from reporting and 
disclosure violations.  However, one must pose the following questions: 1) Have corporations begun to strictly obey 
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the rules? and 2) Has the SEC merely shifted its attention to other areas?  It is highly plausible that SoX may have 
had a dampening effect on these types of regulation breaches, as Juris suggested.  Nonetheless, oversight of the 
revenue recognition process should continue to strengthen regardless of the perceived trend. 
 
Revenue Recognition’s Future 
 
The above-mentioned examples presented cases where companies circumvented the prescribed accounting 
regulations.  With the exception of HP, only GAAP rules were breached.  Since GAAP clearly isn’t tamperproof, 
should there be an extensive modification to revenue recognition rules?  There is a high possibility that a revision 
will take place in near future. 
 
As part of the International Convergence Project, the IASB and the FASB have been working on a joint 
framework to remove the differences between GAAP and IFRS.  With regard to revenue recognition, the agenda 
aims to “create a single revenue recognition standard across industries for both GAAP and IFRS” (Lamoreaux, 
2012).  As of July 24, 2013, the FASB released proposed modifications to GAAP.  The FASB & IASB proposed 
changes to sales with contracts by mandating that greater evidence must be provided in order to book a sale; 
procedures for “identifying separate performance obligations in a contract,” constraints on revenue recognition from 
licenses, and “progress toward completion of a performance obligation” (FASB, 2013, August, Project Update). 
 
Nonetheless, while a generalized approach might appear to be conceptually sound, in the opinion of the 
authors, this might not be practical.  There are inherent differences in the two systems as U.S. GAAP is rendered to 
be more “rules-based,” whereas IFRS is considered to be “principles-based.”  As observed in the HP case, some of 
the revenue recognition rules present under IFRS allowed for more flexibility and interpretation versus GAAP.  
According to Stice, Stice, and Skousen, authors of Intermediate Accounting: 17
th
 edition, because international rules 
aren’t as detailed as GAAP, “GAAP is often referenced when detailed revenue recognition guidance is needed” 
(Stice, 2010, p. 424). 
 
In addition, according to Paul Miller, CPA, an accounting professor at the University of Colorado, the 
proposed revenue recognition modifications appear to be less complex than current law (Lamoreaux, 2012).  
“Simplification signals compromises have been made to make financial statements easier to prepare,” stated Miller 
(Lamoreaux, 2012).  Hence, it is being suggested that IFRS might be deficient in areas with regard to revenue 
recognition.  Although it appears, based on SEC enforcement actions, that cases of revenue recognition violations 
have decreased in recent years, it is possible that this trend could reverse in the future if less stringent revenue 
recognition rules are instituted due to the convergence between GAAP and IFRS. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although revenue recognition errors can prove to be costly to shareholders, creditors, and the corporation 
as a whole, the penalties for cases involving fraud, in the opinion of the authors, should be more substantial.  In all 
of the presented cases, the fines levied by the SEC equated to less than 1% of revenue, as shown in Table 5.  When 
the fine is infinitesimal to the overall revenue, there appears to be little deterrent to stopping revenue manipulation.  
However, if a minimum penalty of 2% of total revenue was implemented for all cases involving revenue recognition 
fraud, the monetary punishments would be much harsher.  For instance, if General Electric paid a penalty of 2% of 
revenue, the fine would have been over $3.1 billion!  A punishment of that magnitude might dissuade management 
from engaging in activities that could cause considerable losses, lawsuits, and significant long-term destruction to 
stakeholder wealth. 
 
Table 5: Fines as a Percentage of Revenue 
($ millions) $ Fine Revenue in Penalty Year % of Revenue
Hewlett-Packard N/A N/A N/A
Nortel $35 $10,948 (2007) 0.32%
TheStreet* $0.41 $50.7 (2012) 0.81%
Diebold $25 $2,823 (2010) 0.89%
General Electric $50 $156,783 (2009) 0.03%
* TheStreet's Penalty is Based on Penalties Levied on Executives  
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Yet, not all revenue recognition difficulties are a direct result from fraud.  As demonstrated in the HP 
example, IFRS appears to be vaguer than GAAP with regard to revenue recognition for software transactions.  
Similar accounting discrepancies will continue to cause issues with international mergers.  U.S. GAAP is regarded 
as “rules-based,” while IFRS is “principles-based.”  These differences are illustrated by the software license 
example, as GAAP required objective measures for fair value determination while IFRS was more subjective.  Thus, 
profits may also appear to be higher under IFRS vs. U.S. GAAP, solely due to the revenue recognition timing 
differences.  Nonetheless, the convergence between GAAP and IFRS cannot allow for accounting rules to become 
less stringent. 
 
In conclusion, cases of revenue recognition fraud are declining, but there must still be greater enforcement 
to prevent corporations from mismanaging accounting rules.  Stakeholders will be negatively impacted when 
earnings restatements are announced and can lose their entire investment, as occurred in the Nortel case.  This could 
have ramifications for not only stockholders, but could also negatively impact creditors and retirement assets within 
pension funds.  Thus, penalties should be more severe to dissuade further accounting mismanagement.  There can 
only be an efficient financial system in economy if there’s trust in the reported numbers.  Integrity is key. 
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